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INTRODUCTION 
This survey reviews some of the noteworthy cases in the area of labor and 
employment law decided by the Sixth Circuit during 1996. In the judgment 
of the author, while it cannot be fairly said that 1996 was an important year 
in the development of doctrine in labor law, it may be said that the court 
continued to view the decisions of the National Labor Relations Board 
("NLRB" or "the Board") with care and, indeed, considerable skepticism. 
The one area of law in which the court unabashedly distanced itself from 
the NLRB was in the area of campaign regulation. In Dayton Hudson 
Department Store Co. v. JVL~1 and Mitchellace, Inc., v. JVLRB/ the Sixth 
Circuit, as it did last year,3 plainly stated that it would review allegations of 
campaign misrepresentations much more exactingly than the NLRB currently 
undertakes. This departure will undoubtedly provide for more litigation and 
uncertainty about the finality of union elections in the Sixth Circuit than in 
other circuits which have embraced the NLRB's hands-off approach to the 
regulation of rhetoric during union organizing campaigns. 
• Professor of Law, Detroit College of Law at Michigan State University. The author 
would like to thank James Zachary Greenwell, Detroit College of Law at Michigan State 
University, class of 1997 for his able assistance in the preparation of this article. 
I. 79 F.3d 546 (6th Cir), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 73 ( 1996). 
2. 90 F. 3d 1150 (6th Cir. 1996). 
3. See NLRB v. Hub Plastics, Inc., 52 F.3d 608 (6th Cir. 1995); see also McConnick, 
Labor and Employment Law, DET. C.L. REv. 497, 502 (1996). 
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I. CASES AND ANALYSIS 
A. Vemco, Inc. v. NLR.Ir 
This case involved issues surrounding the statute of limitations under the 
National Labor Relations Acf ("the NLRA" or "the Act") as well as the 
nature of protected, concerted activity under that statute. 
The facts of the case were straightforward. Anna McMurtry, an employee 
in Vemco's ("the Company") assembly department, distributed copies of a 
document regarding the certification ofthe United Auto Workers ("UAW") 
in the Company's locker room area. She also placed copies of the document 
in the break room. Thereafter, she was summoned to the office of David 
Maxwell, the Company's Human Resource Manager, who told her she could 
not distribute the documents on Company property. According to Ms. 
McMurtry this conversation took place on December 6, 1991. Mr. Maxwell, 
on the other hand, testified that it took place on November 20, 1991. In 
addition to this testimony, the Company introduced a note written by Mr. 
Maxwell regarding this conversation which was dated November 20, 1991. 
The Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") credited Ms. McMurtry and found 
that the disputed conversation took place on December 6, 1991. The NLRB 
affirmed the AU's decision. This finding brought the unfair labor practice 
allegation within the six month statute of limitations. Under Section I O(b) of 
the NLRA,6 a person charging an unfair labor practice must do so within six 
months of the alleged infraction. 
The court of appeals overturned the Board's determination. Disagreeing 
with the characterization that the ALJ had made a credibility resolution, the 
Court determined that substantial evidence supported only one scenario: that 
the conversation in question occurred on November 20, 1991. 
Regarding the alleged protected activity, the facts revealed that on the 
morning ofMonday April20, 1992, employees discovered that their work area 
was inaccessible because racks, boxes and other items had been moved into 
the work area. Crews had taken advantage of the three day Easter weekend 
to paint the floor. Thereafter, nine employees were persuaded by their Union 
representative that it was "'impossible to work, that the area was unsafe, and 
that the employees should all go home. "'7 These nine employees were 
disciplined by the Company. 
4. 79 F. 3d 526 (6th Cir. 1996) 
5. 28 u.s.c. § 158 (1994). 
6. 29 U.S.C. § 160(b)(1994). 
7. Vemco, 79 F.3d at 530. 
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The question in this case was whether the employees' actions were 
"protected" within the meaning of the Act. The ALJ and the NLRB found that 
they were. The court of appeals, however, disagreed. Pointing out that none 
of the employees were required to work under the conditions and that they 
were nevertheless paid for the time they were present but unable to work, the 
court found the activity to be outside the protection of the statute. The 
circumstances of the case, the court said, were distinguishable from those 
present in NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co. 8 where employees engaged in 
a spontaneous work stoppage to protest very cold working conditions. Unlike 
that case, where employees were protesting working conditions, the 
employees in this instance were not required to work at all until the area was 
cleared. Consequently, the court reasoned, this activity, while "concerted" 
was nevertheless not "protected" by the statute. 
Two aspects of the court's decision are noteworthy. First, despite their 
protestations to the contrary, the court, in essence, overruled the ALJ's 
credibility determination that the conversation between McMurtry and 
Maxwell took place as McMurtry testified. Although the court characterized 
their decision as one in which all of the evidence supported a contrary 
opinion, the ALJ, in fact, credited one witness' recollection over another's. 
By reversing the ALJ's decision, then, the court in fact overturned the trier's 
judgment as to the credibility of witnesses offering conflicting testimony. 
Second, the decision is interesting because of the court's commentary upon 
the inherently opaque nature of "protected" activity. Here, the employees 
engaged in concerted activity to protest working conditions. Nevertheless, the 
court found it sufficiently reprehensible under the circumstances of the case 
as to take it outside the ambit of the Act's protection. 
B. Bromley v. Michigan Education Ass 'n9 
The plaintiffs in this case were seven members of the faculty of Central 
Michigan University together with ten public school teachers and one 
educational support person. Although they were represented for purposes of 
collective bargaining by the respondent, Michigan Education Association 
("MEA" or "the Association"), some of the plaintiffs were not actually 
members of the Association. Consequently, they challenged certain fees 
charged them by the MEA inasmuch as they were not members of that 
association. 
8. 370 u.s. 9 (1962). 
9. 82 F.3d 686 (6th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 682 (1997). 
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The fees in question were established by contract between the MEA and the 
school boards employing the plaintiffs. Under Michigan law10 the plaintiffs' 
employers reached agreements with the MEA requiring plaintiffs and all other 
non-union employees to pay service fees to the MEA. These fees were based 
upon so-called "chargeable" costs incurred the year before. The plaintiffs 
alleged, however, that the amount collected by the MEA abridged their First 
Amendment rights because part of the fees were expended for political, 
ideological and other activities not germane to collective bargaining. 
During discovery, the plaintiffs soughtthe identification of the persons who 
had calculated the fees in question as well as the documents supporting their 
calculation. Discovery was stayed after the MEA provided the record of a 
service fee arbitration in which an arbitrator decided that the service fees 
exacted from the plaintiffs did not violate their First Amendment rights. 
Although the arbitrator in that matter had not actually seen the documents 
underlying the union's calculation, the MEA nevertheless sought summary 
judgment on the ground that the arbitral award was entitled to great weight in 
the constitutional challenge. The district court granted the motion. 
On appeal, the court of appeals recognized that although agency shop 
agreements necessarily abridge First Amendment freedoms in some respects, 
the constitutional compromise rendered by the Supreme Court permits public 
employers and unions to enter into such agreements so that unit employees 
may be required to bear the cost of collective bargaining activities. This 
approach denies non-union employees a "free ride" to benefit from such 
activities while not requiring them to subsidize ideological activity to which 
they object. Under Supreme Court doctrine, the test in such a case is whether 
the challenged expenditure was reasonably incurred for the purpose of 
performing the duties of a collective bargaining representative. Under this 
formula, objecting employees may be compelled to pay their fair share of 
direct costs of negotiating and administering a collective bargaining contract 
and settling grievances as well as the costs of activities reasonably used to 
implement or effectuate the duties of the union as exclusive representative. 
Under the Supreme Court of the United States' decision in Chicago 
Teachers Union v. Hudson, 11 public employers and their unions may agree to 
arbitrate the question of whether dues and fees are permissible. Such 
arbitration decisions, although entitled to "great weight," do not have 
preclusive effect in any subsequent action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
In this instance, the court of appeals was not persuaded that the district 
court was justified in accepting the arbitrator's endorsement of the union's 
10. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 423.210 (West 1995). 
II. 475 U.S. 292 (1986). 
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cost allocations without allowing employees' request for discovery of the 
materials on which the calculations were based. In essence, the arbitrator 
relied on summaries of documents not presented in evidence or made available 
for inspection by employees prior to arbitration. And, given the significance 
of the constitutional interests at stake, the court concluded, the district court 
should not have granted the union summary judgment without allowing 
meaningful discovery. 
As to the underlying dispute, the plaintiffs argued that two categories of 
expenditures ought to have been held non-chargeable as a matter of law: 
expenditures for "extra-unit litigation" and for "defensive organizing." Extra-
unit litigation means litigation not directly concerning the unit where the 
objecting employee works. Under Reese v. City of Columbus, 12 the Sixth 
Circuit held that extra-unit litigation costs are in fact chargeable. Defensive 
organizing includes activities designed to protect and strengthen the status of 
recognized or certified unions, including membership retention efforts and 
resistance to decertification proceedings. Regards these costs, the Sixth 
Circuit ruled that defensive organizing serves only the union's self-interest in 
perpetuating itself as the bargaining unit representative - a goal not germane 
to collective bargaining activity and one which may add to First Amendment 
burdens. 
For these reasons, the court of appeals vacated the district court's summary 
judgment order and remanded the matter for further proceedings. 
C. Smiths Indus., Inc. v. NLRB 13 
This case raised an interesting and important question oflaw regarding the 
effect of an established past practice following the expiration of a collective 
bargaining agreement. Under the NLRA, once a collective bargaining 
agreement has expired, past practices may represent the status quo between 
the parties. 14 Upon impasse in negotiations, however, an employer may 
unilaterally change established practices, so long as the change is consistent 
with the employer's final offer of settlement to the union. 15 Here, Smiths 
Industries ("the Company") final offer of settlement to the union contained 
language from the Parties' prior contract that was inconsistent with the past 
practice that had developed under that contract. Thus, the question arose as 
12. 71 F.3d 619 (6th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 386 (1996). 
13. 86 F.3d 76 (6th Cir. 1996). 
14. See Sacramento Union, 258 N.L.R.B. 1074 (1981). 
15. See Borden, Inc. v. NLRB, 19 F.3d 502, 512 (1Oth Cir. 1994); see also Sacramento 
Union, 258 N.L.R.B. at 1075. 
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to the status of the established practice once the contract expired and the 
Company unilaterally invoked the terms of the prior contract. 
In February 1994, Mitchner, a supervisor, instructed several employees 
under his supervision to move certain products to another department. 
Decker, a union steward, complained that this was not bargaining unit work. 
Mitchner responded that this assignment was specifically permitted under a 
letter of agreement between the Company and the union. 
Later, Decker said he intended to grieve the matter and announced he was 
going to the union office to investigate the matter. Mitchner instructed Decker 
that he was not allowed to go to the union office for that purpose. This 
response was predicated on a provision in the collective bargaining contract 
that restricted access by union stewards to the union office to those occasions 
when their presence was requested by a committeeman. Thus, Mitchner 
directed Decker to return to his work station and to write out a grievance or 
return to work. Although Decker did not press the matter that day, the 
following day he told Mitchner he was going to the union office over this 
grievance. Mitchner reiterated his instruction of the previous day that Decker 
should return to his work station and write a grievance or return to work. This 
time, Decker disobeyed the order and proceeded to the union office. He was 
suspended for three days. 
The UA W ("the Union") filed section S(a)(l), (3) and (5) charges against 
the company. The contract between the parties stated that the company would 
provide a work area for the shop committee person and the President. 
Stewards could utilize the area only when a committeeman requested the 
steward to investigate a grievance. Notwithstanding this language, the ALJ 
sustained the union's charges, reasoning that the company had a long 
established practice of allowing stewards to visit the union office without such 
a request. The NLRB affirmed the ALJ's decision, concluding that the 
practice had become an implied term and a condition of employment. 
Consequently, the Board held, the company had made unilateral changes in 
the terms and conditions of employment without first negotiating with the 
umon. 
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit rejected the Board's conclusion as to the legal 
effect of the past practice. In this case, the court concluded, the collective 
bargaining contract had expired and the parties had negotiated to the point of 
impasse. At that point, the court observed, the company made its final offer 
to the union. The offer contained the language of the previous agreement 
restricting access to the union office. The conflict in this case arose after the 
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company's unilateral imposition of its final offer and, therefore, the court 
held, "past practices were no longer controlling."16 
Having concluded that the Board made an error of law in finding that the 
Company violated sections S(a)(l) and (S) and having further found that 
Decker was properly disciplined for insubordination, the court reversed the 
Board's decision and denied enforcement of its order. 
D. WF. Bolin Co. v. NLRB 17 
W.F. Bolin Company ("WFB" or "the Company") petitioned the court to 
set aside a decision of the NLRB finding that it laid off two employees, 
Wright and Kehl, for complaining about their wages and working conditions 
inviolationofsections8(a)(l)and(3) of the NLRA In September 1991, 
WFB, a painting contractor, hired painters from the hiring hall of Local 93 of 
the International Brotherhood of Painters and Allied Workers ("the Union"). 
During the course of a project to paint a middle school, disputes arose 
between WFB and its painters regarding the Company's compliance with the 
collective bargaining contract. The painters, led by Wright and Kehl, 
complained that WFB was not abiding by the contract in the areas of travel 
pay, extra pay for working with epoxy paint and the timely distribution of 
paychecks. 
In November 1991, Minke, the Union Steward, raised the issue oftravel 
pay with WFB' s site foreman, Tisher. Minke handed Tisher a copy of the 
collective bargaining contract to show him that it provided for travel pay. 
Tisher, however, threw the contract on the floor without examining it. Later, 
Wright and Kehl also complained about travel pay. Kehl also complained to 
Tisher about not receiving extra pay for epoxy work and the distribution of 
paychecks at the work site. 
On December 24, 1991, the employees met to discuss their complaints. 
Wright spoke about travel pay and Kehl acted as spokesperson regarding the 
other issues. Tisher was present at this meeting. Shortly thereafter, Minke, 
at Kehl's urging, asked WFB's Superintendent, Ring, about epoxy pay. Ring 
responded, '"If you guys keep complaining I'm going to fire the whole crew 
and bring in a whole new crew.'"18 
On January 10, 1992, WFB determined that it needed only five painters 
instead of seven to complete the project and laid off Wright and Kehl, despite 
the fact that substantial work remained on the project. Although there was 
16. Smiths Indus., 86 F.3d at 80. 
17. 70 F.3d 863 (6th Cir. 1995). 
18. W.F. Bolin Co., 70 F.3d at 868. 
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credible evidence to the contrary, Tisher was clearly less qualified than the 
others to perform the remaining work. 
In the ensuing unfair labor practice litigation, the ALJ found that although 
Ring's statement breached section 8(a)(l) of the Act, WFB did not lay off 
Wright and Kehl in violation of the Act. Upon review, the NLRB affirmed the 
ALJ's decision with respect to Ring's statement, but reversed the decision 
regarding the lawfulness of the layoffs. With respect to the layoff decision, 
the NLRB found that Ring's unlawful remark evidenced animus toward the 
protected activities of Wright and Ring. The Board also relied on Tisher's 
having thrown down the contract as evidence of hostility toward the 
employees' protected activities. Finally, the Board concluded that WFB had 
failed to show that but for the protected activity, Wright and Kehl would have 
been laid off in any event. 
The court of appeals affirmed the decision of the NLRB, following the 
approach approved by the Supreme Court of the United States in NLRB v. 
Transportation Management Corp. 19 Under that approach, once the general 
counsel has established a prima facie case that anti-union animus constituted 
a substantial or motivating factor in the layoff, the burden shifts to the 
employer to establish that the employee would have been laid off even if he 
or she had not engaged in the protected activity.20 
As described above, the court concluded thatthe NLRB had met its initial 
burden and that WFB had failed to rebut the prima facie case. Extending 
deference to the NLRB under the "substantial evidence" standard, the court 
enforced the Board's order and denied WFB's petition for review. 
E. Carrington South Health Care Center, Inc. v. NLRB21 
In this matter, employees of the Carrington South Health Care Center (''the 
Center") voted to be represented by a union. The Center, however, filed 
objections to the election on the ground that the Union engaged in racially 
inflammatory appeals. The regional director overruled the objection, without 
conducting a hearing, and the NLRB refused to review the Regional Director's 
decision. Thereafter, the Center refused to bargain with the union in order to 
challenge the legitimacy of the election. 
The Center essentially complained about three cartoons and one quote that 
appeared in the union's campaign literature. The first cartoon depicted a 
white man flipping a coin and saying "'I'll take a dozen'" while a group of 
19. 462 U.S. 393 (1983). 
20. Transportation Management, 462 U.S. at 398-403. 
21. 76 F.3d 802 (6th Cir. 1996). 
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employees looked on.22 Many of the workers were clearly intended to appear 
black. The second cartoon depicted a group of people laboring to pull a 
wagon which carried a person brandishing a whip. The caption had the driver 
saying, "'You are employed at my Will!!! '"23 The third cartoon showed a 
white "boss" pointing a nervous looking black employee to an electric chair, 
stating "'You don't need you union rep. Just have a seat and we'll discuss 
your grievance like two rational human beings. "'24 
The quote in controversy came from a famous speech by Dr. Martin Luther 
King, Jr. which said, 
We've got some difficult days ahead. But it really doesn't matter with me now. 
Because I've been to the mountain top. Like anybody, I would like to live a long life. 
Longevity has its place ... But I'm not concerned about that now. I just want to do 
God's will! 
And He's allowed me to go up to the mountain. And I've looked over, and I've 
seen the Promised Land. I may not get there with you, but I want you to know tonight 
that we as a people will get to the Promised Land. 
So I'm happy tonight. I'm not worried about anything. I'm not fearing any man. 
'Mine eyes have seen the glory of the coming of the Lord.' 25 
Under the NLRA, a regional director must conduct a hearing on objections 
to an election if the objecting party "'raises substantial and material factual 
issues and proffers evidence that establishes a prima facie case for setting 
aside the election. "'26 Moreover, the court ruled, an election must be set aside 
"when the objecting party demonstrates that pre-election conduct 'seeks to 
overstress and exacerbate racial feelings' through a deliberate appeal to racial 
prejudice.'m 
The Court also looked to the seminal case of Sewell Manufacturing 
Company. 28 as setting forth the relevant test in cases of this variety. There, the 
NLRB ruled that the party making racially based statements has the burden of 
demonstrating that the statements were truthful and germane, with doubts to 
be resolved in favor of the objecting party. 
In this instance, the court determined that the cartoons deliberately sought 
to exacerbate racial feelings by irrelevant and inflammatory appeals. 
22. See Carrington, 76 F.3d at 803. 
23. /d. 
24. /d. at 803-04. 
25. !d. at 804. 
26. State Bank oflndia v. NLRB, 808 F.2d 526, 538 (7th Cir. 1986) (quoting NLRB 
v. Chicago Marine Containers, Inc., 745 F.2d 493, 496 (7th Cir. 1984)). 
27. NLRB v. Eurodrive, Inc. 724 F.2d 556, 558 (6th Cir. 1984)(quoting Sewell Mfg., 
Inc., 138 N.L.R.B. 66, 71 (1962)). 
28. 138 N.L.R.B. 66 (1962). 
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Although two of the cartoons made a passing reference to legitimate campaign 
issues, the court said, the imagery used was "quite troubling" and appealed to 
racial prejudice. While the quote from Dr. King was '"devoid of inflammatory 
rhetoric or appeals to racial bigotry, "'29 the court concluded that it was equally 
devoid of anything related to election campaign issues. 
Having found that the Company raised substantial and material issues, the 
case was remanded to the Regional Director for a hearing on petitioner's 
objections to the cartoons. 
F. Tel Data Corp. v. NLRB30 
This case was a standard Section 8(a)(l), (3) and (5) case involving alleged 
unilateral changes in terms and conditions of employment as well as claims 
that employee discharges were motivated by employees' protected, concerted 
activity. 
Tel Data Corporation ("Tel Data" or "the Company") installs electronic 
communications systems in retail stores. It has had collective bargaining 
agreements with the Communications Workers of America ("CWA" or "the 
Union") for several years. In October, 1991 an employee, Dale Frederick, 
complained that the Company was not complying with the terms of the 
contract. On November 12, 1991, Tel Data instituted a new procedure 
regarding employee use of corporate telephone credit cards. Under the new 
procedure, employees were forbidden from using the cards for personal use, 
but out-of-town employees could claim an allowance for calls made. 
On November 19, 1991, the Company issued another memorandum 
regarding the use of Company vans by out-of-town employees during off work 
hours. Under that policy, employees were permitted to "drive company vans 
a reasonable distance from job sites for meals, shopping for necessities, etc. 
and, of course, to hotels/motels for lodging purposes."31 
On December 13, 1991 the Company held a meeting of employees at which 
the Company's President announced that he knew that at least eight employees 
had contacted the Union regarding these matters. He added that '"since all 
this union crap has come up, "'32 there would be some changes. Employees 
could not have it both ways, he said, requiring adherence to the contract, while 
expecting special benefits the Company had been providing beyond the 
contract requirements. He also threatened to fire all the employees, close Tel 
Data and reopen the Company under another name. 
29. Carrington, 76 F.3d at 807. 
30. 90 F.3d 1195 (6th Cir. 1996). 
31. Tel Data, 90 F.3d at 1196. 
32. Id. at 1197. 
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On November 25, 1991, an employee, Sherry Scott, was fired for violating 
the van policy by using a vehicle for an extended trip without Company 
approval. Then, three months later, Frederick was terminated for charging 
personal telephone calls in violation of the telephone credit card policy. 
In the subsequent unfair labor practice trial, the ALJ held that the Company 
violated Sections 8(a)(l) and (5) of the NLRA by unilaterally implementing 
changes in the credit card policy in retaliation against employees engaging in 
protected activity. He also determined that the Company violated Sections 
8(a)(l) and (3) by discharging Frederick for allegedly violating its unlawfully 
promulgated policy. Regardimg the van policy, the ALJ held that the 
Company did not violate the Act because the new policy did not vary 
materially from its prior unwritten policy. Consequently, the ALJ determined, 
the discharge of Scott did not violate the Act. 
The NLRB upheld the ALJ's decision regarding the credit card policy, but 
reversed his decision regarding the van policy. The Board held that the new 
policy did vary from the Company's prior policy, that it was instituted in 
retaliation and that, consequently, Scott's discharge violated the Act. 
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit held that substantial evidence supported the 
Board's holding as to Frederick. Particularly significant, the court found, was 
evidence that a supervisor had said about Frederick, '"I can't help him, he's 
gone to the union, his days are numbered. "'33 Regarding the van policy and 
the discharge of Scott, however, the court of appeals reversed the NL~. 
Like the ALJ, the court held that the van policy was "essentially a codification 
of Tel Data's previous position on the issue" and that the discharge was for 
cause and not in response to protected concerted activity ?4 
G. Dayton Hudson Department Store Co. v. NLRB35 
This case involved the Sixth Circuit's view of the law surrounding 
campaign misrepresentations. As observers of labor law are all too well 
aware, the degree to which the Board will regulate campaign misconduct has 
changed dramatically in recent years, with the Board currently taking 
essentially a hands-off approach. The Sixth Circuit, on the other hand, has 
taken a very different, and more exacting, approach to the Board's role in 
regulating campaign misconduct. 
In this case, some employees of one of Hudson's stores sought to be 
represented by the UA W ("the Union"). In May 1990, an election was held 
33. !d. at 1198. 
34. !d. at 1200. 
35. 79 F.3d 546 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 73 (1996). 
HeinOnline -- 1997 Det. C.L. Rev. 738 1997
738 Law Review [2:727 
which the UAW won by a margin of274 to 179. Hudson's, however, lodged 
objections to the election contending that the election was tainted by a letter 
sent to employees three days before the election. Among other things, the 
letter stated that Hudson's had "'claimed profits of OVER 60 MILLION 
DOLLARS in our Westland Hudson's store alone last year."'36 In fact, 
however, the total sales for the store for the year in question had totalled $52.5 
million and profits had been only $1.4 million. 
The NLRB overruled Hudson's objection and held that the letter did not 
warrant a new election under its standard as set forth in Midland National Life 
Insurance Co. 37 and certified the UA W as the bargaining representative for 
employees at Hudson's Westland store. Hudson's, however, refused to 
bargain with the UA W based upon its beliefthatthe Union's certification was 
inappropriate. The Board then ordered Hudson's to bargain with the UAW. 
Two weeks after the order to bargain was entered, however, Hudson's 
moved to reopen the record alleging that newly discovered evidence revealed 
that forged authorization cards had been used to generate additional support 
for the Union. The Board denied Hudson's motion, holding that the 
allegations, even if true, did not warrant a new election under Midland Life. 
Hudson's petitioned the Sixth Circuit to review the Board's refusal to 
reopen the record. The court, in turn, granted the petition and remanded the 
case to the Board with instructions to conduct a "full inquiry into such 
questions as how many authorization cards were forged, the actual use to 
which those cards were put, when these incidents occurred, and whether and 
in what context any misrepresentations concerning the cards occurred."38 The 
court also directed the NLRB to re-evaluate the UA W pre-election letter under 
its holding in VanDorn Plastic Machinery Co. v. NLRB. 39 
In VanDorn, the Sixth Circuit had parted ways with the NLRB and had 
indicated a "reluctance to be bound by the Midland National Life rule in every 
case."40 Instead, the Court wrote: 
36. Dayton Hudson, 79 F.3d at 548. 
37. 263 N.L.R.B. 127 (1982). In this case the Board held: 
[W)e will no longer probe into the truth or falsity of the parties' campaign statements, 
and . . . we will not set elections aside on the basis of misleading campaign 
statements. We will, however, intervene in cases where a party has used forged 
documents which render the voters unable to recognize propaganda for what it is. 
Thus, we will set an election aside not because of the substance of the representation, 
but because of the deceptive manner in which it was made, a manner which renders 
employees unable to evaluate the forgery for what it is. 
Midland National, 263 N.L.R.B. at 133. 
38. Dayton Hudson, 987 F.2d at 367. 
39. 736 F. 2d 343 (6th Cir. 1984). 
40. VanDorn, 736 at 348. 
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There may be cases where no forgery can be proved, but where the misrepresentation 
is so pervasive and the deception so artful that employees will be unable to separate 
truth from untruth and where their right to a free and fair choice will be affected. We 
agree with the Board that it should not set aside an election on the basis of the 
substance of representations alone, but only on the deceptive manner in which 
representations are made.41 
739 
In this instance, a hearing was held regarding the allegedly forged cards and 
their effect. The ALJ held that the Company's forgery allegations were a 
"total fabrication" and that the UA W pre-election letter had not affected the 
outcome of the election. Consequently, the ALJ reaffirmed the order to 
bargain. The NLRB again affirmed the ALJ's findings and recommendations. 
On appeal again the Sixth Circuit reiterated its view that the NLRA calls 
for greater scrutiny of campaign misrepresentations than the NLRB envisions. 
Thus, as in VanDorn, the Court again said that "where the misrepresentation 
is so pervasive and the deception so artful that employees will be unable to 
separate truth from untruth," an election will be set aside.42 In this instance, 
however, the court held that the pre-election letter was not sufficiently 
deceptive as to warrant the setting aside of the election. Regarding the forgery 
allegations, the court also sustained the ALJ's decision. While the court 
disagreed with the ALJ's characterization of the evidence as a ''total 
fabrication", it nevertheless held for the Union on the question of whether the 
cards influenced the outcome of the election. 
While the Sixth Circuit, in the end, affirmed the Board's conclusion that 
campaign irregularities and misrepresentations were not sufficient to set aside 
the election, the significance of this case lies in the court's reaffirmation that 
it will look much more carefully at questions surrounding campaign 
misrepresentations than the Board. The Court pointedly said,"[ w ]e stress that 
we will continue to review cases arising under Midland National Life and Van 
Dorn very carefully."43 Indeed, the Court again revisited the question of the 
degree of scrutiny to be applied to campaign rhetoric in the next case. 
H. Mitchellace, Inc. v. NLRir 
This matter involved two consolidated cases. Mitchellace, Inc. (''the 
Company") manufactures shoe products. Following a heated organizational 
campaign by the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union ("the 
Union"), a representation election was held and the Union was certified as the 
41. /d. (citing Midland National, 263 N.L.R.B. at 131). 
42. Dayton Hudson, 79 F.3d at 550 (quoting VanDorn, 736 F.2d at 348). 
43. /d. at 551. 
44. 90 F.3d 1150 (6th Cir. 1996). 
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employees' bargaining representative. In the first aspect of the case, the 
Company contended that the election was sullied by Union fliers distributed 
shortly before the election and that the NLRB wrongly excluded two 
employees from the bargaining unit. In the second aspect of the case, the 
Company challenged the Board's determination that it had discriminatorily 
discharged two employees as a result of their union activity. 
With respect to the first aspect of the case, the facts revealed that the Union 
distributed three fliers within twenty-four hours of the election. The first 
communication concerned the discharge of an employee, Pennington, whom 
the Company contended was terminated for destruction of Company property. 
In this flier, the Union accurately reported that the Board had issued a 
complaint against the Company alleging that the termination was prompted by 
Pennington's union activity. It also stated, however, that the Company had 
been found guilty of discharging employees for union activity and that it 
would be required to reinstate Pennington and compensate her for pay lost as 
a result of her termination. In fact, of course, the issuance of the complaint 
did not constitute a determination of unlawful activity, but instead was the 
functional equivalent of an indictment. 
The Company responded to this communication with one of its own entitled 
"More Union Lies!! !"45 This flier accurately stated that the Company had not 
been found guilty of unlawful conduct. The Union, in tum, issued a second 
flier entitled "Justice" which stated that the Board had issued a complaint 
against the Company for discharging Pennington. It also said, however, that 
the Cincinnati office of the NLRB had found the Company guilty of unlawful 
activity. 
The third flier concerned the status of certain employees provided to the 
Company by a temporary agency, Kelly Services. These employees had been 
excluded from the unit by the Regional Director and the NLRB had denied 
review of that decision. The third flier wrongly stated that the Union "'has 
reason to believe that the Cincinnati branch office may have made a mistake 
when they excluded Kelly workers from voting. Therefore, they are 
investigating this issue further and still have not made a determination either 
way."'46 
Following the election, the Company objected to the fliers. The NLRB 
analyzed the Union's communications under the Sixth Circuit's VanDorn 
standard and concluded that the fliers did not contain a misrepresentation "so 
pervasive and artful as to affect employees' right to a free and fair choice."47 
45. Mitchellace, 90 F.3d at 1154. 
46. /d.(emphasis omitted). 
47. /d. at 1155. 
HeinOnline -- 1997 Det. C.L. Rev. 741 1997
1997] Labor and Employment Law 741 
In so doing, the Court specifically rejected the Company's principal objection 
to the timing of the communications - that they were distributed wi~hin 
twenty-four hours of the election. The court plainly stated, "this court has 
never held that timing alone is determinative."48 Rather, the court said, a 
combination of factors, including whether the employer was aware of the 
communication and had an opportunity to respond, was pivotal. Here, of 
course, the Company was fully aware of the fliers and in fact responded with 
a communication of its own. 
Regarding the bargaining unit status of the two employees, the Sixth Circuit 
affirmed the Board's determination that they were office clericals and did not 
share a community of interest with the production or maintenance employees. 
Thus, their exclusion from the unit was proper. 
CONCLUSION 
As the foregoing recitation indicates, 1996 was largely an unexceptional 
year in terms of important developments in the area of labor and employment 
law in the Sixth Circuit. It can be fairly said, however, that the last two cases, 
Dayton Hudson and Mitchellace further solidify the Sixth Circuit's 
disagreement with the NLRB as to the proper scope of governmental 
involvement in union election campaigns. The NLRB has essentially said it 
will no longer closely review campaign rhetoric for misrepresentations. The 
Sixth Circuit, on the other hand, has again indicated its willingness to enter 
the fray and to set aside elections where misrepresentations made during an 
election campaign are likely to have substantially mislead the employees. 
This approach, in tum, will likely lead to greater litigation in the area and 
uncertainty as to the outcome of union elections in this circuit. 
48. /d. 
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